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COMMENT
RICHARDS V. LLOYD'S OF LONDON:
THE NINTH CIRCUIT DENIES ACCESS
TO THE SECURITIES LAWS TO
AMERICAN INVESTORS'
I. INTRODUCTION
Although 1990 might not be the most memorable year of
the Twentieth Century, it certainly was for one of Great
Britain's most recognized financial institutions, Lloyd's of Lon-
don. In 1990, Lloyd's recorded an estimated loss of
£2,910,000,000.' This capped off several previous years of mas-
sive losses. Even the most unsophisticated observer of the
financial scene could see that many Lloyd's underwriters were
going to suffer a financial disaster.
Although Lloyd's is an English institution, they have pre-
viously raised capital by allowing Americans to invest in
Lloyd's. During the 1980s, Americans investing in Lloyd's of
London were required to enter into a choice-of-law clause stip-
ulating that all disputes be resolved in London. When these
investors were later faced with the possibility of heavy losses,
they wished to sue Lloyd's in the United States under the
federal securities laws, which they believed made any foreign
choice-of-law clause unenforceable. Richards v. Lloyd's of Lon-
don (Richards II) was a Ninth circuit en banc decision that
withdrew its prior holding (Richards I) that the anti-waiver
provisions of the securities laws rendered the choice-of-law
clause contained in Lloyd's contract with American investors
unenforceable. The Richards H decision brings the Ninth Cir-
t Richards v. Lloyd's of London, 135 F.3d 1289 (9th Cir. 1998).
1. Julian Barnes, Deficit Millionaires, THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 20, 1993, at
74, 75.
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cult into conformity with the other circuits that have looked
into this matter.2 Although the allegations by the American
underwriters in the various federal circuits differed from case
to case, the essential issue in all of them is the enforceability
of both the forum selection and a choice-of-law clause in the
original contract between American investors and Lloyd's of
London.
In Richards I, the plaintiffs alleged, among other things,
that Lloyd's violated various provisions of both the Securities
Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Acts).
The investors, or underwriters, otherwise known as "Names,"
however, had entered into an agreement with Lloyd's of Lon-
don ("Lloyd's Agreement") that stipulated English law would
govern any disputes between the parties and that any disputes
arising from the agreement would be resolved in London.3 The
consensus of all of the circuits before Richards I (and the Fifth
Circuit shortly after Richards I) was that the Lloyd's Agree-
ment was valid, based primarily upon the deference the Su-
preme Court has shown to forum selection clauses in the
past.4 In Richards I, however, the Ninth Circuit bucked the
2. Richards v. Lloyd's of London, 135 F.3d 1289 (9th Cir. 1998) [hereinafter
Richards II and distinguishing this case from the superseded decision in Richards
v. Lloyd's of London, 107 F.3d 1422 (9th Cir. 1997) hereinafter "Richards 1"]. Oth-
er Lloyd's cases relate to the choice-of-law issue. See Allen v. Lloyd's of London,
94 F.3d 923 (4th Cir. 1996); Bonny v. Society of Lloyd's, 3 F.3d 156 (7th Cir.
1993); Roby v. Corporation of Lloyd's, 996 F.2d 1353 (2d Cir. 1993); Riley v.
Kingsley Underwriting Agencies Ltd., 969 F.2d 953 (10th Cir. 1992); Haynsworth
v. Lloyd's of London, 121 F.3d 956 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 140 L.Ed. 2d 666
(1998).
3. Paragraph 2.1 of this agreement reads as follows: "The rights and obli-
gations of the parties arising out of or relating to the Member's membership of,
and/or underwriting of insurance business at, Lloyd's and any other matter re-
ferred to in this Undertaking, shall be governed by and construed in accordance of
the laws of England." Paragraph 2.2 of this agreement reads in relevant part as
follows: "Each party irrevocably agrees that the courts of England shall have ex-
clusive jurisdiction to settle any dispute and/or controversy of whatsoever nature
arising out of or relating to the Member's membership and/or underwriting of
insurance business at Lloyd's ... ." [hereinafter Lloyd's Agreement]. Richards I,
107 F.3d at 1425. These choice-of-law and forum selection clauses are contained in
what Lloyd's calls the "General Undertaking, which all Names are required to
enter into to become a Name . . . ." Allen v. Lloyd's of London, No. 3:96cv522,
slip op. at 28 n.2 (E.D. Va. Aug. 23, 1996).
4. The principal cases relied on by the courts include Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614 (1985); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver
Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974); The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
The applicability of these cases to the Lloyd's matter will be discussed at length
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trend and determined that the Acts' anti-waiver provisions
prohibit any private agreement to waive the protections of the
Acts and the rules of the Securities Exchange Commission.
Section 14 of the 1933 Securities Act provides as follows:
Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any
person acquiring any security to waive compliance with
any provision of this subchapter or of the rules and regu-
lation of the Commission shall be void.5
In Richards I, the court held that this provision covers all
contracts concerning sales of securities between United States
citizens and foreign entities, such as the Lloyd's Agreement.
The court saw nothing in the statute that distinguished be-
tween domestic and international transactions. Essentially the
Ninth Circuit held that an act of Congress specifically prohibit-
ing parties from contracting out of the securities laws pre-
cludes any judicial interpretation of the enforceability of such
agreements. Under the Richards I analysis, the forum selection
clause and choice-of law clause are simply illegal, and there-
fore the plaintiffs have the right to sue under the United
States securities laws. This decision by the Ninth Circuit,
which contravened the findings of many other circuit courts,
proved controversial enough to warrant a re-hearing of the
entire matter en banc.
In Richards II, the court reversed the original decision,
and held that various Supreme Court precedents (which will be
discussed in detail later) allowed parties to enter into choice of
law clauses in international dealings. The en banc decision
then went on to take a leap of faith-similar to that of the
other circuits-and held that the parties were able to contract
for a choice of law clause in a securities transaction even
though: 1) the choice clause would deprive the American party
of a statutory right; and 2) Congress has specifically mandated
that waiver of the securities laws is forbidden. This Comment
will argue that the Richards II holding misapplied the relevant
Supreme Court precedents, and, more importantly, gave a
infra Part III.
5. 15 U.S.C. § 77n. See also Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §
78cc(a), which reads: "[a]ny condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person
to waive compliance with any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation
thereunder, or of any rule of an exchange required thereby shall be void."
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green light to unscrupulous securities dealers who can now,
under firm authority, trade securities without the protections
of the Acts by simply inserting a choice-of-law clause in their
contract, and setting up shop off-shore.
The issue of whether or not to apply American securities
laws to all international securities transactions involving
American investors is, of course, important to the litigants
themselves because of the large amounts of money involved. It
is also significant because it represents a major policy choice
on the part of the United States in regard to how the interna-
tional community will approach dealing with American inves-
tors. The United States is known for having strict regulations
regarding securities transactions, which represented a rejection
of the common law rule of caveat emptor.6 A determination
that U.S. law will govern in all international transactions
where securities are involved may inhibit foreign solicitation
here, as international corporations fear what they may per-
ceive as American parochialism.' By applying U.S. laws to
agreements that specifically call for the application of laws of
another sovereign state, as these agreements do, the United
States may be accused of disturbing the norms of international
financial dealings and of catering to parochial interests.8 On
the other hand, applying American law to these transactions
guarantees that our citizens will not be subjected to caveat
emptor simply because a foreign company has a choice-of-law
provision in their contract.9 Additionally, it may send a signal
to the world that we believe our financial disclosure safeguards
in securities transactions best protect the international
market's integrity. Moreover, as the Richards I court held,
there is a strong argument that Congress should determine
this major policy choice, since Congress enacted the anti-waiv-
er provisions. Until Congress exempts agreements in interna-
6. See Roby, 996 F.2d .at 1364 (citing SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 584 F.2d
1018, 1025 n.51 (D.C. Cir. 1978)), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1071 (1979).
7. See The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 9.
8. See id. The Court states '[tihe expansion of American business and indus-
try will hardly be encouraged if, notwithstanding solemn contracts, we insist on a
parochial concept that all disputes must be resolved under our laws and our
courts." Id.
9. See Jennifer M. Eck, Turning Back The Clock: A Judicial Return to Cave-
at Emptor for U.S. Investors in Foreign Markets, 19 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
313 (1994) (advocating this position at length).
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tional securities transactions from the Acts, the anti-waiver
provisions should apply.' °
This Comment will analyze how the Ninth Circuit reached
its original controversial decision not to enforce the Lloyd's
Agreement in Richards I, and how it was reversed by the en
banc decision, Richards I. Part II of this Comment will give a
brief background of Lloyd's the institution for those readers
unfamiliar with their basic workings. To put in context the
primary issues raised by the litigants, Part III of this Com-
ment will trace the development of the Supreme Court's deci-
sions regarding choice-of-law and forum selection clauses with
an emphasis on those aspects of the cases that bear signifi-
cantly on the Lloyd's situation. The most significant legal prin-
ciple to be derived from this analysis is whether the Court's
deference to honor choice of law and forum selection provisions
in an effort to accommodate the realities of international com-
merce (as seen in cases such as The Bremen, Scherk v. Alberto-
Culver Co.," and Mitsubishi), eliminates the Acts' anti-waiver
provisions" in international securities transactions.
Part IV of this Comment will focus on the controversial
holding of Richards I that the anti-waiver provisions of the
Acts preclude enforcement of the Lloyd's agreement. The deci-
sion will be broken down into its three main parts: 1) the
courts can not contravene an express congressional policy deci-
sion, 2) the courts should not enforce a choice-of-law clause
when it would deprive the citizen of the "substantive"
protections of United States law, and 3) it would violate Ameri-
10. The majority in Richards I put the issue as follows: "The fundamental
issue dividing the majority and the minority [is] whether the courts or Congress
determines our national policy after Congress has spoken," Richards I, 107 F.3d at
1429. The California Court of Appeals has come to the same conclusion in a re-
lated context: "Any new exception, such as 'promotion of international commerce'
would have to come from the Legislature." West v. Lloyd's of London, No.
B095440, slip. op. at 8 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 23, 1997). That suit was brought by
American Names against Lloyd's for violations of state law. Lloyd's attempted to
have it dismissed on the grounds the parties were bound by the Lloyd's Agree-
ment. See supra note 3 (or in the alternative, grounds of forum non conveniens).
The Names contended that the Agreement was unenforceable because the anti-
waiver provisions of the state statute, Cal. Corp. Code § 25701 (West 1997) did
not contain an exemption for this transaction. The court used in part the federal
Lloyd's cases as a guideline, and concurred with the decision in Richards I in
finding the Lloyd's Agreement unenforceable.
11. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
12. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a).
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can public policy to let the English courts decide this case
because of deficiencies in their securities laws. These three
aspects of Richards I will be measured against their outcome
in Richards II, as well as in some of the other Lloyd's cases in
the federal circuits. This comparison will include an analysis of
how far American courts will go in enforcing choice-of-law and
forum selection clauses in securities contracts between Amer-
ican citizens and foreign entities when, in the absence of fraud,
they are freely bargained by competent parties. The Richards
II decision has left open the question of whether all interna-
tional securities transactions are subject to clauses like the
Lloyd's Agreement, as have all of the circuit courts. In addi-
tion, unlike Richards I, Richards 11 did not find that a plain
reading of the anti-waiver provisions prohibit enforcement of
the Lloyd's agreement."3
The second issue to be analyzed is the so-called substance-
procedure theory put forth by the American Names from the
seminal Supreme Court securities arbitration cases and other
relevant choice-of-law/forum selection cases. 4 The arbitration
cases held that the anti-waiver provisions of the Acts do not
prohibit disputes from being resolved in arbitration. In making
that determination, the Supreme Court distinguished between
substantive protections afforded by the Acts from the mere
procedural forum used to resolve the dispute. The theory pro-
poses that the Supreme Court has only recognized enforcement
of forum selection clauses, not choice of law clauses. Basically,
the Court supports parties contracting where the disputes will
be settled, but not what law will be used.
Part IV will conclude by arguing that the Richards I deci-
sion was correct in its holding that Congress, not the courts,
should decide if American citizens can contract out of the Acts.
This is the logical result of a straightforward reading of the
statutes' anti-waiver provisions. There are two additional rea-
sons why Richards I was correct. First, the Richards I court
properly followed the relevant Supreme Court decisions by rec-
13. See Roby v. Corporation of Lloyd's, 996 F.2d 1353, 1362-1363 (2d Cir.
1993); Allen v. Lloyd's of London, 94 F.3d 923, 929 (4th Cr. 1996).
14. See Roby, 996 F.2d at 1362 (distinguishing Scherk); Rodriguez de Quias v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989). The American Names de-
rived in part from the McMahon decision the theory of substance against proce-
dure. Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1986).
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ognizing that the Court has cautioned against enforcing choice-
of-law and forum selection clauses when it would deprive the
litigant of a statutory protection, despite the Court's overall
approval of such clauses. In fact, the Court has never explicitly
allowed Americans to waive their statutory protections in secu-
rities transactions. Secondly, Richards I respected the overall
policy of the American securities laws by deferring to the legis-
lature the job of determining whether American citizens can
contract out of the Acts. Such a policy decision could potential-
ly affect thousands of American investors. The courts are not
the proper institution to take the initiative in enacting an
optional waiver of the Acts. In regard to the "substance v.
procedure" theory that arose in the Lloyd's matter, this com-
ment argues that the theory as interpreted by the courts creat-
ed confusion. When substantive laws afforded by a statute
reflecting a strong public policy are lost due to a choice-of-law
clause, then courts should be reluctant to enforce it. On the
other hand, Haynsworth v Lloyd's of London5 (the 5th
circuit's Lloyd's decision) was correct in that it accurately fol-
lows the spirit of recent Supreme Court decisions. The Fifth
Circuit held that a foreign forum is not inadequate simply be-
cause it does not identically reflect American "substantive"
law. 6 Haynsworth was ultimately incorrect, however, in its
substance-procedure analysis because it failed to distinguish
that the substantive law in question in the Lloyd's matter was
afforded by statute reflecting a strong public policy, and,
therefore, may not be waived absent an express declaration by
Congress.
Part V of this Comment will look at the final controversial
aspect of the Richards I decision, which was its contention that
British securities laws are insufficient to adequately protect
American investors and therefore do not provide an adequate
forum. Although the court did not need to go into this area
since they had already decided that the anti-waiver provisions
of the Acts precluded enforcement of the Lloyd's agreement,
15. See generally Haynsworth v. Lloyd's of London, 121 F.3d 956 (5th Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 140 L.Ed. 2d 666, available in 1996 LEXIS 2533.
16. "It cannot be the case that, by virtue of a foreign forum selection clause
standing alone, the domestic party to an international business agreement retains
a 'substantive right' to assert the remedies and protections of American statutes in
the contractually agreed-upon forum." Id. at 967.
19981
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they argued anyway that Lloyds' special situation in English
law made it unfair to Americans to have to sue in English
courts. In addition, the district court in the unreported Allen
case made a detailed comparison of the United States securi-
ties laws and the remedies available in England and concluded
that English forum is inadequate to decide this case. Moreover,
when courts are faced in the future with issues similar to
Lloyd's which involve dubious off-shore investment schemes
armed with contracts containing choice-of-law clauses, the
courts should not hesitate to strike the clauses down as
against public policy. Under the Richards H holding, however,
that may not be possible. It is time for the courts to remember,
as the court did-in Richards I, that justice sometimes requires
more than the facilitation of international commerce.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE LLOYD'S SITUATION: THE OPERATION,
THE FINANCIAL DISASTER AND THE GROUNDS OF THE
"RICHARDS" LAWSUIT
The legendary Lloyd's of London was developed in a coffee
house in London in the late Seventeenth Century by a group of
underwriters who shared risks insuring English commercial
shipping. 7 Contrary to popular understanding, Lloyd's is not
an insurance company; rather it is an insurance market."
The market is completely self-regulated under Lloyd's own
rules" system known as the Lloyd's Acts.2" The basic mem-
berships in Lloyd's are the Names. The Names are the individ-
ual underwriters who are placed in syndicates by Members
Agent's who are selected from among them. The syndicates are
run by Managing Agents, and contain as few as two, and as
many as hundreds of Names.2' Prospective Names must clear
17. Allen v. Lloyd's of London, No. 3:96cv522, slip op. at 4 (E.D. Va. Aug. 23,
1996). The District Court, in an exhaustive opinion, reached a similar position as
the Ninth Circuit in Richards L Although the decision was overruled by the
Fourth Circuit, its comprehensive treatment of the Lloyd's matter is unsurpassed
by other courts. See Allen, 94 F.3d at 926. The opinion also deals extensively with
the inadequacy of English law in relation to American securities law. The opinion
is not reported. Id.
18. See Allen, No. 3:96cv522, slip op. at 5.
19. 22 HALSBURY ch. 2, Part 1.
20. See Allen, 94 F.3d at 926. See also, A.C. PAGE & R.B. FERGUSON, INVES-
TOR PROTECTION 243-44 (1992).
21. See Allen, No. 3:96cv522, slip op. at 10.
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several hurdles to become members in Lloyd's, such as a per-
sonal interview, an entrance fee, a "means test,"22 and depos-
iting a letter of credit. 3 The Name pledges his or her entire
net worth (down to the "last button"), which means unlimited
liability, to the amount of risk assigned to them.' Therefore
the Names have unlimited liability for all claims made by the
insured, no matter how substantial the losses.
Since Names sign on for unlimited liability, why would
anyone want to become a Name? Although each individual
Name had his or her own motivation to join Lloyd's, there are
a few particular strong benefits that attract Names. In Eng-
land, Lloyd's is a time-honored institution that has had mem-
bers for generations. Lloyd's membership connotes prestige and
affluence. That does not explain, however, why Americans
would want to join. Some American Names have joined Lloyd's,
in part, because they are Anglophiles. Lloyd's membership is
the closest thing they can get to actual English citizenshipY
In regard to the investment itself, Lloyd's could potentially
provide a huge financial return. Lloyd's Names make profits
from the insurance premiums paid into their syndicates. If
there are little or no losses incurred by the syndicate (i.e., few
claims are paid out), the premiums paid by the insured are
returned to the Names as profits. Perhaps the greatest finan-
cial incentive for the Names is that they are not actually putt-
ing up their money to underwrite the insurance risk. They are
merely "pledging" the money. Names only pay when losses are
incurred by the syndicate. Therefore, the initial investment
does not cost the Names any capital. Although the Names are
required to place a letter of credit as collateral, it can consist of
investment securities. Even the small amount placed with
Lloyd's for good faith is actually making money on interest.
Therefore, the prospect of high profits resulting from the in-
vestment of little capital is a strong incentive to become a
Name.
22. The test is described as follows: "Although the means test has varied
through the years, currently an individual must prove individual wealth in excess
of £250,000." Thomas W. Wilson, How Lloyd's Functions: A Primer on Operations,
in LLOYD'S AND THE LONDON INSURANCE MARKET 11, 46 (1994).
23. See Allen, No. 3:96cv522, slip op. at 9.
24. See Wilson, supra note 22, at 44.
25. See ELIZABETH LUESSENHOP & MARTIN MAYER, RISKY BUSINESS: AN INSID-
ERS ACCOUNT OF THE DISASTER AT LLOYD'S OF LONDON 24 (1995).
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Until 1969, Names were not recruited from the United
States. Since then 3,159 Americans have become Names,2 6
about 5% of Lloyd's membership. In this period Lloyd's raised
over $600,000,000 in letters of credit (security for future under-
writing) from its American investors, and, of course their lia-
bility as underwriters.27 In 1995, however, Lloyd's returned to
its policy of denying eligibility to individual American citizens
for membership." In addition, since 1994 Lloyd's allowed cor-
porations for the first time to join as "Corporate Names."29
Managing Agents, as the day-to-day managers of each
syndicate, employ "active underwriters" who determine what
risk the syndicate will take on. This takes place at the Lloyd's
offices in London where the "active" underwriter takes a posi-
tion at a "box" and entertains offers of risk from brokers."
Usually several syndicates combine to insure a risk, with most
of the negotiation conducted between a "lead underwriter" and
a broker, with other syndicates signing on to the risk later,
based on the reputation of the "lead underwriter."31 This pro-
cess often results in many syndicates involved in one risk ven-
ture. In Lloyd's, brokers representing clients deal directly with
the underwriters. The brokers are held to uberrima fides (the
utmost good faith) when representing the nature of the risk to
the underwriters.32 The brokers shop their risk and find the
best price for their clients. This bargaining illustrates why
Lloyd's is in fact an insurance market, not a traditional Ameri-
can insurance company like Prudential or State Farm.
Unlike American "generally accepted accounting princi-
ples," Lloyd's operates on a three year accounting system."
All of a Name's profits from their passive underwriting or
"investment" are calculated three years after a syndicate has
26. See Wilson, supra note 22, at 22.
27. See id. See also Richards I, 107 F.3d at 1424.
28. See Allen, No. 3:96cv522, slip op. at 7.
29. See Deborah A. Tompkinson, Challenge at Lloyd's, in LLOYD'S AND THE
LONDON INSURANCE MARKET 123, 131-140 (1994) (explaining how the "Corporate
Name" system operates).
30. See Wilson, supra note 22, at 22. The "box" is actually a real box-like
object in the Lloyd's offices on Lime Street where the risks are bargained over.
See Louis A. Chiafullo, The Maelstrom at Lloyd's of London: Is it Sink or Swim
for Policy Holders?, 26 SETON HALL L. REV. 1392, 1397 (1996).
31. See Wilson, supra note 22, at 37.
32. Id. at 32-33.
33. Id. at 48-51.
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closed. The syndicate itself, however, only has a life of one
year. If the syndicate is to continue insuring the risk after the
year is over, it must be re-formed. Lloyd's contends that this
system, a holdover from the days of very long commercial sail-
ing voyages, provides more accuracy in accounting. A Manag-
ing Agent, however, may choose not to close the syndicate at
the end of a given year if he is unable to ascertain if there are
any more potential claims arising from that syndicate.34 Syn-
dicates also may remain open if the Managing Agent can not
close the account. As will be explained, this can happen when
the syndicate contains many "long-tail" liabilities.35 When a
syndicate has to pay out a claim, the Name can be called upon
to meet the liability. Therefore, the decision of what risks the
syndicate is going to take on is the most critical to the Names'
interest. Poor or negligent decisions by Managing Agents have
led to the financial ruin of many Names.
The events which led to the massive losses at Lloyd's
36
are varied and complex, but there are some specific ones that
can be briefly pointed out to help illustrate the situation.
Lloyd's suffered badly from problems resulting from syndicates
incorrectly gauging the reinsurance market which resulted in
the London Market Excess of Loss Spiral, (LMX spiral).37 The
LMX spiral derived from a common practice known as "excess
of loss reinsurance." Excess of loss is essential for catastrophic
events "where the original coverage is granted for natural
perils such as wind, storm, tempest, hurricane, earthquake,
bush fires, etc."38 Another way to look at the LMX plan is as
"a layering of insurance risks." It is described as follows:
One underwriter will agree to pay claims on a particular risk
34. See Chiafullo, supra note 30, at 1392, 1396.
35. Closing the syndicate when the syndicate has insured "long tail" risks is
difficult. Closing is accomplished when they can establish approximately how much
more liability the syndicate has, and then purchases reinsurance to cover it.
Therefore, only when the syndicate has enough reinsurance to cover all liabilities
can the syndicate be officially "closed." See West v. Lloyd's of London, No.
B095440, slip. op. at 8 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 23, 1997). Of course, until the syndicate
is closed, the Names are personally liable for all claims. Id.
36. From 1988-1991, Lloyd's of London sustained approximately
$12,600,000,000 in losses. See Stephen Lewis, The "Names" Litigation, in LLOYD'S
AND THE LONDON INSURANCE MARKET, 173, 175 (1994).
37. See Chiafullo, supra note 30, at 1406.
38. Id.
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of, say, more than $1,000,000 and up to $2,000,000. The
second underwriter will underwrite another layer, paying
claims, say, of $1,000,000 in excess of the first $2,000,000.
The third underwriter might accept another $1,000,000 in
excess of $3,000,000 and so on. 9
The scheme was perhaps the most lucrative enterprise for
the syndicates, because liabilities rarely got far up the ladder
of reinsurance. The trouble with Lloyd's started when many
syndicates reinsured with each other creating a complex situa-
tion that caused underwriters "to lose touch with the nature of
the risks they were accepting," and, moreover, the syndicates
often found that they had reinsured themselves at a certain
point in the LMX spiral. 0 In other words, a syndicate may
have taken on reinsurance which exposed them to risk at one
level, and then again took on more reinsurance on the same
risk exposing themselves for more risk further up the ladder. If
the amount of the losses claimed were great enough to reach
the entire reinsurance ladder, a syndicate could be responsible
for many exposures in the ladder. A catastrophic event could
result in one syndicate having the responsibilities of paying
numerous times on the same risk. Therefore, instead of the
LMX protecting syndicates from large losses by limiting their
exposure, it created a false assurance that a syndicate could
meet its liabilities without suffering huge losses. In addition,
the reinsurers miscalculated the amount of time it would take
for losses to be passed "up the line." In 1988, losses from natu-
ral disasters moved rapidly up the line, and "caught many
reinsurers off guard."4' In short, the LMX spiral drove many
syndicates into ruin because the purpose of excess of loss rein-
surance was defeated by unforeseen events such as natural
disasters in the 1980's (like the windstorms of Piper Alpha)
and early 1990's, and irresponsible behavior on the part of the
39. See William Pitt, Fear LMX Spiral May Be Rebuilt, J. COM., Sept. 4,
1991, at 3C.
40. Id. It is important to remember that the LMX was one of the most lucra-
tive sources of income for syndicates before the string of natural disasters in the
late 1980's and early 1990's.
41. Id. See also Chiafullo, supra note 30, at 1407, (quoting LLOYD'S OF LON-
DON, AN INTRODUCTION TO LLoYD'S 1, 18, (Lloyd's Training Centre 1989) "Catastro-
phe excess of loss reinsurance is essential where the original coverage is granted
for natural perils such as wind, storm, tempest, hurricane, earthquake, bush fires
etc., in order to prevent too great an exposure to any one event/disaster.").
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syndicates' Managing Agents.42
Another major source of financial trouble for Lloyd's (and,
therefore, the Names) is the inability of agents to close out old
accounts. The Names, as discussed earlier, are liable for all
claims arising from their syndicate until it is closed. Unfortu-
nately, Lloyd's was the underwriter for many businesses that
encountered liabilities based on "asbestos, environmental pollu-
tion, Agent Orange, and toxic tort cases generally."3 These
types of situations create "long-tail" liabilities. "Long-tail" lia-
bilities are claims that may not manifest themselves for a long
period of time, perhaps years.' In Lloyd's, there are hundreds
of syndicates that remain open from the early 1980's, resulting
in a systematic bleeding dry of the underwriting Names with
"no cap or end in sight."45 The Names have unlimited liability
until the syndicate is closed.
Not content to watch their entire fortunes be plunged into
the unlimited liability abyss of Lloyd's, about 17,000 Names
banded together to fight.46 In England, the Names based their
case primarily upon negligence and breach of fiduciary du-
ties.47 As discussed earlier, however, American Names were
contractually bound to litigate in London, thereby losing access
to American courts.48 The problem with the Lloyd's agreement
is that it prevents any litigation under the disclosure require-
ments of the Acts, which represents the harm done to the
Names. Their grievance, according to one leading American
Name, is that "[Lloyd's] did not say 'Do you understand that
you have unlimited liability, and there are unquantifiable
asbestos and pollution losses which we are concealing,... and
the possibility of years you cannot ever get out' .... 49
42. See LUESSENHOP & MAYER, supra note 25, at 43. -
43. Lewis, supra note 36, at 175.
44. See Chiafullo, supra note 30, at 1409 n.60.
45. Lewis, supra note 36, at 176. Lloyd's plan to close these old syndicates is
known as its "Equitase" scheme. It hopes to cap all unlimited liability incurred
previously to 1992. See Chiafullo, supra note 30, at 1408.
46. Lewis, supra note 36, at 176.
47. See, e.g., Deeny v. Gooda Walker Ltd., 4 All E.R. 289 (1995).
48. See Lloyd's Agreement, supra note 3.
49. See LUESSENHOP & MAYER, supra note 25, at 235 (quoting Richard
Rosenblatt, member of the American Names Association). "[Tihe possibility of years
you can never get out" makes reference to the Lloyd's policy that a "year," which
is the life of a syndicate, is not closed out (meaning the Name is off the hook)
until the Name is able to do so by purchasing reinsurance to cover any future
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The Richards case was filed on October 9, 1994 in the
Southern District of California.0 The Names alleged, inter
alia, that Lloyd's violated the securities laws of this country by
not meeting SEC standards for prospectuses, and not register-
ing under the 1933 Act.5' They also claimed that Lloyd's
placed them in syndicates that were saddled with long-tail
liabilities from asbestos and toxic waste, and vulnerable to the
LMX spiral problems. These syndicates had very little chance
of turning a profit. In addition, the plaintiffs also alleged that
the extent of their potential liabilities were not disclosed to
them.52 In order to have these claims heard, however, the
Lloyd's Agreement,53 binding them to London courts had to be
defeated. On April 28, 1995, the district court held that the
Lloyd's Agreement should be enforced unless it would be "un-
reasonable" to do so. As will be discussed, this ruling relies
heavily on the Supreme Court's holding in The Bremen. 4
Therefore, when approaching the Ninth Circuit on appeal, the
Names were faced with the reality that all of the other federal
circuits had faced essentially the same issue and found against
them. From Lloyd's point of view, millions, perhaps billions of
dollars, potentially hinged upon the enforcement of the Lloyd's
Agreement.
III. SUPREME COURT INTERPRETATION OF INTERNATIONAL
CHOICE OF LAW AND FORUM SELECTION ISSUES
A. The Bremen v. Zapata55
As stated earlier, the Supreme Court has moved in the
last twenty-five years from an aversion to choice-of-law and
forum selection provisions, especially arbitration agree-
ments," to a general acceptance of them. The first significant
losses. Id. The Names are liable for losses incurred in the syndicate until that
time. Id.
50. See Richards I, 107 F.3d at 1424.
51. Id. at 1425.
52. Id.
53. See Lloyd's Agreement, supra note 3.
54. See Richards I, 107 F.3d at 1426.
55. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
56. The Court in Mitsubishi explained that arbitration provisions were previ-
ously treated with "anachronistic judicial hostility... which American courts
borrowed from the English common law." Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrys-
ler Plymouth, 473 U.S. at 625 n.14 (1985).
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change in policy came in the decision The Bremen v. Zapata,
where forum selection clauses in international transactions
were presumed valid and enforceable. Prior to The Bremen,
American courts viewed such clauses with mistrust. The pre-
sumption was that they were contrary to public policy and
therefore unenforceable." The Bremen, therefore, marked a
radical shift in judicial policy at the time.
The Bremen involved a sale of an oil rig from an American
corporation, Zapata, to an Italian concern. The American cor-
poration contracted with a German company, Unterweser, to
tow the rig to Italy. The parties had previously agreed as part
of the original contract to settle disputes in England, under
English law.58 When problems arose, however, and the rig
was damaged and towed to Tampa, Florida, Zapata sued in
U.S. court. The district court ruled in favor of Zapata, as did
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in an 8-6 en banc decision.
The Court of Appeals determined that the clause could not be
enforced because of precedent and American courts were con-
strained to honor such clauses when one of the parties was an
American citizen.59 In essence, the pre-The Bremen position of
the Fifth Circuit was that American courts could honor such
agreements between an American and non-American party
only when the selected forum site would be more convenient to
the particulars of the litigation.
The Court's change in policy in The Bremen can be attrib-
uted, in part, to economic realities. Specifically, the Court held
that "[I]n the light of present-day commercial realities and
expanding international trade we conclude that the forum
clause should control absent a strong showing that it should be
set aside."" Therefore, the burden in attempting to avoid a
contractual forum provision is on the party seeking avoidance.
In addition, the showing that must be made in order to avoid
the contractual provision is extremely high. The party must
"clearly show that enforcement would be unreasonable and
unjust, or that the clause was invalid for such reasons as fraud
or overreaching."61 The Court also determined that "a contrac-
57. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 13.
58. Id. at nn.2-3.
59. Id. at n.10.
60. Id. at 15.
61. Id.
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tual choice-of-forum clause should be held unenforceable if
enforcement would contravene a strong public policy of the
forum in which the suit is being brought." 2 The Court gave
no test to determine what exactly constitutes a "strong public
policy."
B. Mitsubishi v. Soler63
In Mitsubishi v. Soler the Supreme Court further rein-
forced its commitment to honoring contractual choice of law
selections in international agreements. The Mitsubishi case
concerned the enforceability of an arbitration agreement be-
tween a car manufacturer, Mitsubishi, and an American car
dealer.' The First Circuit Court of Appeals found that the
counter claims invoking antitrust laws were unarbitrable as a
matter of public policy. Therefore the United States Courts
could not hear the antitrust claims despite the agreement
between the parties.65 The Supreme Court reversed on the
grounds that there should be no presumption that the anti-
trust laws are not eligible to be settled by a private agreement
to arbitrate.66 The Court emphasized that there should no
longer be a presumption "that international arbitration will not
provide an adequate mechanism,"'7 in effect placing the bur-
den on the party who wishes to get out of the arbitration
62. Id.
63. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
64. The sales contract between the parties contained the following clause: "All
disputes, controversies of differences between [Mitsubishi and [Soler] out of or in
relation to Articles I-B through V of this Agreement of for the breach thereof,
shall be finally settled by arbitration in Japan in accordance with the rules and
regulations of the Japan Commercial Arbitration Association." Id. at 617.
65. The Court of Appeals followed the rationale of American Safety Equip.
Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968) (holding that rights
stemming from the antitrust laws were not appropriate for arbitration). See also
Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 620-21.
66. "M[We find no warrant in the Arbitration Act for implying in every con-
tract within its ken a presumption against arbitration of statutory claims."
Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 625. The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, pro-
vides for the courts to compel parties to arbitration pursuant to an agreement.
The United States has also signed and ratified the major international agreement
on international arbitration awards. Convention on the Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T 2519, 330 U.N.T.S. 3.
This treaty commits the United States to honoring international arbitration agree-
ments unless it finds that the agreement "is null and void, inoperative or incapa-
ble of being performed." Id.
67. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 636.
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agreement to make a showing of why the foreign arbitration
system will not protect his rights. In conclusion, the Court
reasoned that old judicial hostilities towards arbitration, in-
cluding hostility directed towards international arbitration
have to be discarded in order to test how fair and effective the
new system will be.
Similar to the holding in The Bremen, however, the Su-
preme Court did not shut the door completely on those parties
wishing to litigate rather than arbitrate pursuant to a contrac-
tual agreement. The Court stated that if the choice-of-law
clause would preclude a statutory remedy for antitrust viola-
tions, "we would have little hesitation in condemning the
agreement as against public policy."" The Mitsubishi decision
in fact laid out a clear guideline as to the judicial policy in
determining whether to honor arbitration agreements, and
recognized that Congress can evidence an intent to prohibit
waiver of judicial remedies. The Court stated:
By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not
forgo substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only sub-
mits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather that a judicial
forum. It trades the procedures and opportunity for review of
the court-room for the simplicity, informality, and expedition
of arbitration. We must assume that if Congress intended the
substantive protection against waiver of the right to a judi-
cial forum, that intention will be deductible from the text or
legislative history.69
The Court made a distinction between procedure and sub-
stance to be considered by a court faced with determining
whether to release a party from a contractual agreement to
arbitrate. This analysis would be a factor in the Richards I
decision, although it was also a source for confusion. °
68. Id. at n.19.
69. Id. at 628.
70. See, e.g., Darrel Hall, Note, No Way Out: An Argument Against Permitting
Parties to Opt Out of U.S. Securities Laws In International Transactions 97
COL-M. L. REv. 57 (1997) [hereinafter No Way Out] (criticizing the Second,
Fourth, and Tenth Circuits' analysis in the Lloyd's litigation). The author argues
that in finding for Lloyd's and enforcing the choice-of-law and forum selection
agreements, the circuits either neglected to follow the Supreme Court's substan-
tive-procedural distinction, or, as in Roby, misapplied it. The substance-procedure
distinction is also used for support of the American Names position in Richards I
by the Securities and Exchange Commission. See Brief of the Securities Exchange
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In the aftermath of the Mitsubishi decision, the status of
the enforceability of foreign arbitration agreements can be
summed up as follows: 1) courts should give great weight to
agreements freely entered into by private parties; 2) there is
no presumption that foreign arbitration is inherently incapable
of adequately adjudicating the conflict before it; and 3) when
faced with a statutory claim, the court must look to congressio-
nal intent to see if there is evidence that waiver of traditional
judicial forum was contemplated. The Court also articulated a
test for this issue: First, the court should consider "whether
the parties' agreement to arbitrate reached [statutory] is-
sues... and then... [consider] whether legal constraints
external to the parties' agreement foreclosed the arbitration of
those claims."7'
Recently, the Supreme Court revisited the issue of a for-
eign arbitration clause potentially denying an American liti-
gant a statutory protection in Vimar Seguros.1 2 In Vimar, the
Court reiterated its position in Mitsubishi that it would strike
down a choice clause in an international agreement if it de-
prived the litigants of a statutory remedy.
C. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.73
In Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., the Supreme Court ad-
dressed the issue of the anti-waiver provisions in the context of
Commission, Amicus Curiae at 18-19 [hereinafter SEC Briefi; Richards I, 107 F.3d
at 1422. However, the distinction between procedure and substance is exaggerated
in Richards I, and the better argument for the plaintiffs is the anti-waiver provi-
sions themselves. The substance-procedure argument is vague, and if applied could
defeat the whole purpose of the direction honoring of contractual choice clauses
that the Court is moving in. See section IV, infra. Perhaps the key factor in deter-
mining enforceability of the choice-of-law and selection clauses is the substantive
law derived from a statutory right of a United States citizen. That statutory right
should not be waived unless the significance of the public policy is adequately
reflected by the foreign arbitrators. In the Lloyd's situation, this would require a
comprehensive comparative securities law analysis of the type conducted by the
District Court. See Allen v. Lloyd's of London, No. 3:96cv522 (E.D. Va. Aug. 23,
1996).
71. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628.
72. Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros S.A. v. MV Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528 (1995)
(holding that the statutory provisions of the Carriage of Goods Sea Act (COGSA),
46 U.S.C. § 1300 prevented, inter alia, any agreement from lessening the liability
of a carrier could be opted out of in this instance because the litigants had pro-
vided for an American court to review the foreign arbitration).
73. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
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an international securities transaction. The issue of whether
the Acts can be waived by American citizens, however, was not
reached. The Court ruled on the enforceability of an arbitration
clause in an international transaction where the plaintiff
charged violations of section 10b of the 1934 Exchange Act.
The transactions concerned the sale of property sold in Germa-
ny and Liechtenstein, and the contract was signed in Aus-
tria. 4 The Court held in a 5-4 decision that the parties would
be bound to their prior agreement to arbitrate all discrepancies
in Paris, under the laws of the State of Illinois, once again
reinforcing its policy of honoring international agreements.
Although Scherk involved enforcement of a choice-of-
law/forum selection clause in an international securities trans-
action, the case does not make clear the Court's position on
waiving the statutory provisions of the Acts themselves. While
following generally The Bremen and the line of favoring inter-
national choice/forum clauses in the interest of commerce,75
the Court enforced the clause knowing that in fact the sub-
stantive provisions of the securities laws would be available to
the parties due to the choice-of-law clause stipulating Illinois
law. While the majority leans towards a general approval of ac-
knowledging both forum and choice-of-law clauses, it specifi-
cally leaves open the question of the waiving of the securities
laws in cases involving transactions between American inves-
tors and foreign companies. The majority acknowledges that its
holding does not address the anti-waiver provisions:
The dissent opinion raises the specter that our holding today
will leave American investors at the mercy of multinational
corporations with 'vast operations around the world'... Our
decision, of course, has no bearing on the scope of the substan-
tive provisions of the federal securities laws for the simple
reason that the question is not presented in this case.76
The Scherk decision, as well as McMahon, 7 are seminal
74. Id. at 515.
75. "A contractual provision specifying in advance the forum in which disputes
shall be litigated and the law to be applied is . . . an almost indispensable pre-
condition to achievement of the orderliness and predictability essential to any
international business transaction." Id. at 516.
76. Id. at 518 n.12. The Court had made no determination if the transaction
concerned a security; id. at 514 n.8 (emphasis added).
77. Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
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securities law cases because they overturned prior holdings
that arbitration was not allowed in resolving claims brought
under the Acts. Although the majority left no doubt about their
enthusiasm for enforcing choice clauses, they do not appear,
however, to have mustered enough support to endorse the
waiver of the securities laws in international transactions.
Although Lloyd's relies in part on Scherk to bar its American
Names from access to American courts, it is not clear if it is
applicable to their situation because of the ambiguity in the
Court's holding. The Court left open the substantive-procedural
issue in the securities laws context that later would become an
issue in the McMahon decision. In addition, the Court did not
overturn its statements in Mitsubishi about not enforcing
choice-of-law agreements that operate to deny statutory rights.
Scherk is only relevant to the Lloyd's Agreement 8 if the
Court meant that Americans are free to contract out of the
protection of the Acts in international agreements. 9 The ar-
gument for this interpretation is based simply on the great
lengths the Court has gone in expressing their unequivocal
support for freedom of contracting both choice and forum claus-
es in the interest of international trade and commerce. There
is no doubt that the Court recognizes ascertaining the choice-
of-law ahead of time is a benefit to our economy. Still, the
Court did not reach the issue. It may be that Scherk stands for
enforcement of choice-of-law clauses in general international
agreements involving securities only when the contacts with
the United States are not substantial.0 In that case, the
courts may have to conduct a "contacts" type analysis when
confronted with the issue.
D. Summary of the Supreme Court Position on Choice-Of-Law
and Forum Selection Provisions In International
Agreements
The Supreme Court has clearly spoken in favor of uphold-
ing forum selection and choice of law provisions in internation-
78. See Lloyd's Agreement, supra note 3.
79. In Richards I, the court also raised other problems with Lloyd's reliance
on Scherk, such as the nature of the transactions in Scherk were almost exclusive-
ly European, and that the Court also had to deal with the Federal Arbitration
Act. See 9 U.S.C. § 1.
80. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 517 n.11 (1974).
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al agreements. Prior judicial prejudices against these clauses
were overturned in favor of a general acceptance of them pri-
marily because of their affect on growing international com-
merce. The policy of the Court is illustrated in an excerpt from
Scherk:
A parochial refusal by the courts of one country to enforce an
international arbitration agreement would not only frustrate
these purposes, but would invite unseemly and mutually
destructive jockeying by the parties to secure tactical litiga-
tion advantages... [It would] damage the fabric of interna-
tional commerce and trade, and imperil the willingness and
ability of businessmen to enter into international commercial
agreements."8
The presumption of the validity of choice-of-law and forum
selection clauses has limitations. Generally, the provisions will
not be enforced if they are not reasonable. Clauses can be
"unreasonable" in three ways:82
1) The clause was entered into by fraud or overreaching.8
2) The complaining party will for all practical purposes be
deprived of his day in court because of the unfairness or
inconvenience of the selected forum.84
81. Id. at 516-17.
82. See, e.g., Roby v. Corporation of Lloyd's, 996 F.2d 1353, 1363 (2d Cir.
1993); Allen v. Lloyd's of London, 94 F.3d 923, 928 (4th Cir. 1996).
83. This was not applicable to Richards I because the court found fraud was
not present in the actual signing of the agreement itself. See Richards I, 107 F.3d
at 1426.
84. American Names have claimed that British courts have been unfair. See
American Names Association, U.K Court Denies Investors' Right To Sue For
Fraud; U.S. Lloyd's Investors Allegations Confirmed, Press Release, Apr. 24, 1997.
In the wake of the Society of Lloyd's v. Wilkinson & Others, the British Courts
are accused of abandoning investor protection in what is characterized as the "pay
now, sue later" decision. Id. The Wilkinson decision and its effect on the American
courts' analysis of the adequacy of the British forum will be discussed infra. It is
agreed by observers, however, that British law does contain remedies somewhat
similar to those in the United States in securities transactions. See NORMAN S.
POSER, INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES REGULATION 293-298 (1991) (comparing § 62 of
the British Financial Services Act, which provides a private right of action, with
civil liability under the American securities law). Lloyd's, however, is exempt from
the English securities laws. Id.
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3) The fundamental unfairness of the chosen law may deprive
the plaintiff of a remedy.'
More importantly to the Lloyd's agreement problem, how-
ever, is that the Supreme Court has clearly been more hesitant
in approving enforcement of choice-of-law clauses when it
would result in the loss of a statutory remedy. The Mitsubishi
decision specifically stated that it would strike down a choice-
of-law agreement if it would deprive a litigant of protections of
the antitrust laws. 6 Although the Court did not mention any
other specific statutory provisions, like the securities laws, it is
clear that waiver of statutory rights is an issue that the Court
finds problematic. Moreover, the Court's concern for waiver of
statutory rights was again seen recently in Vimar Seguros.
Therefore, the Supreme Court's position on enforceability of
choice-of-law clauses in international agreements has two
aspects: 1) if the clause simply agrees on which substantive
law to apply to resolve disputes, it will be upheld as long as it
is not unreasonable, but 2) if the choice-of-law clause would
deprive a party of a statutory protection, it should not be en-
forced unless the foreign forum contains a suitable alternative
substantive protection.
IV. THE ENFORCEABILITY OF THE CHOICE OF LAW AND FORUM
SELECTION CLAUSES IN THE LLOYD'S AGREEMENT: THE
ANTI-WAIVER PROVISIONS OF THE ACTS AND THE
SUBSTANCE-PROCEDURE DISTINCTION IN SUPREME COURT
PRECEDENTS
A. The Plain Meaning Interpretation of the Anti-waiver
Provisions in Richards v. Lloyd's of London
The Richards I court held that the anti-waiver provisions
of the Acts 7 prohibit enforcement of the Lloyd's Agreement.
85. This "public policy" argument is the most important to the Lloyd's situ-
ation. The issue is whether the disclosure provisions of Rule 10b (or the anti-fraud
provision of the proxy rules) would give plaintiffs a cause of action unavailable in
England, and having found that they would, do those provisions of the American
securities laws represent a strong public policy that opting out of them would
render them unenforceable. Id.
86. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth, 473 U.S. 636
n.19 (1985).
87. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a).
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According to Richards I, "Congress has already determined
such clauses were void."8 The decision continues, when dis-
cussing the "reasonableness" of the clauses under the estab-
lished The Bremen test, "In our view... the reasonableness of
the Choice Clauses is not determinative of their enforceability.
The Securities Acts' anti-waiver provisions themselves render
the Choice Clauses void, making it unnecessary to examine
whether enforcement of the clauses would be reasonable under
the test set forth in The Bremen. ... "" Therefore, the analy-
sis of the reasonableness of the clauses, determined under the
Supreme Court cases discussed above, is not applicable to the
Lloyd's cases.'
In contrast, the Richards I court found that the enforce-
ability of the Lloyd's Agreement must come under a The Bre-
men analysis." The court gave the following reasons for this:
1) the court deciding The Bremen specifically made reference to
enforcing a forum selection clause when it conflicts with a
relevant statute.92 2) the Scherk decision relied on The Bre-
men to resolve an international securities question s and 3) if
they found that The Bremen did not apply, the "reach of the
United States securities laws would be unbounded."9 All
three of the courts reasons to apply a The Bremen test are
incorrect. First, The Bremen only contemplated a forum-selec-
tion clause to take precedent over a conflicting statute, not a
choice-of-law clause. In addition, as the court admits, there
was no statute involved in The Bremen. There is no argument
about the enforceability of forum selection clauses. Therefore,
the court's reasoning does not support their position. Second,
88. Richards I, 107 F.3d at 1426.
89. Id. at 1428-29.
90. See SEC Brief, supra note 70, at 15 (stating that "[tihe anti-waiver provi-
sions, however, are not simply an expression of public policy that favors United
States securities laws unless- other comparative laws are available. Rather, they
are an express and unequivocal directive that the rights and obligations under the
securities laws cannot be waived. This determination has been made by Congress,
and the courts are not free to substitute their own public policy determinations").
91. "We analyze the validity of the choice clause under The Bremen ....
where the Supreme Court stated that courts should enforce choice of law clauses
in cases of 'freely negotiated private international agreements." Richards II, 135
F.3d at 1293 (quoting The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 12-13 (1972).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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the Scherk court's reliance on The Bremen is not applicable to
the Lloyd's Agreement because the Scherk decision did not
consider the waiver of the securities laws. Furthermore, the
contacts with the United States were minimal. As for the third
reason given by Richards II, the securities laws are not un-
bounded when applied to this situation, where the parties were
solicited in the United States and the syndicates insured Unit-
ed States interests. Considering the totality of the American
contacts in this case, the Richards I warning of the overreach-
ing of the American securities laws is clearly unwarranted.
Lloyd's did not have a peripheral contact with the United
States. In fact, Lloyd's was heavily committed to the American
market.
In distinguishing Scherk, the Richards I court argued that
the circumstances of the case made it almost entirely interna-
tional in character, thus less likely a transaction the securities
laws were meant to protect.95 The transaction in Scherk had
minimal contacts with the United States. The American party
was an institution, not a private individual. In contrast, in the
Lloyd's situation, the Names were solicited in the United
States. The Names are individual investors, not part of a large
corporation with experience in international dispute resolution.
It also distinguished Scherk from the Lloyd's situation because
in Scherk, the Court was confronted with two statutes, the
Exchange Act and the Federal Arbitration Act. In such a situa-
tion when confronted by two statutes, the Court's consideration
of international commerce "tipped the balance" in favor of
upholding the arbitration." Finally, the Richards I court es-
sentially agreed with the Securities Exchange Commission
(SEC) in their analysis of Scherk. The SEC argued that the
Court allowed the arbitration to take place in Paris since there
was no question of not applying American law because the
parties' agreement specified that disputes would be resolved in
accordance with Illinois law.97 In other words, there has never
been a Supreme Court precedent for allowing an exception to
95. Richards I, 107 F.3d at 1427.
96. See id. at 1427. The Scherk court had to make a choice between applying
one of two statutes which were in conflict. Therefore, faced with that choice the
Court looked to the policy of favoring international commerce as sort of a "tie-
breaker." Id.
97. See SEC Brief, supra note 70, at 17.
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the anti-waiver provisions for "fostering international com-
merce."
The Richards II interpretation of Scherk, in contrast, goes
too far beyond the holding of the Supreme Court. The Richards
II decision asserts that "t]he Supreme Court repeatedly recog-
nized in Scherk that parties to an international securities
transaction may choose law other than that of the United
States."98 They cite to two footnotes within the Scherk opinion
for support of their position. The first, footnote eleven in
Scherk, points out that the greater part of the securities trans-
action in Scherk took place outside of the United States, so
applying the United States laws would be overreaching. The
second cite, footnote thirteen, comments that some forum selec-
tion clauses can be read to encompass a choice-of-law selection.
This is irrelevant to the enforceability of the Lloyd's Agree-
ment because the issue is whether choice-of-law is allowed at
all in securities transactions. The expectations of the parties
are subservient to the dictates of the statute. The sweeping
Richards 1I generalization that parties are free to pre-deter-
mine the law governing potential disputes in international
securities transactions regarding Americans misreads the rele-
vant precedents, except, perhaps, to the extent that the con-
tacts with the United States are minimal or peripheral.
B. Richards I Contrasted With the Other Circuit Opinions on
the Lloyd's Agreement
The Richards I position on the anti-waiver provisions was
a radical departure from the other circuit cases99 on the same
matter. The Riley.. and Allen'' decisions did not consider
98. Richards II, 135 F.3d at 1295.
99. See Allen v. Lloyd's of London, 94 F.3d 923 (4th Cir. 1996); Bonny v.
Society of Lloyd's, 3 F.3d 156 (7th Cir. 1993); Roby v. Corporation of Lloyd's, 996
F.2d 1353 (2d Cir. 1993); Riley v. Kingsley Underwriting Agencies Ltd., 969 F.2d
953 (10th Cir. 1992); Haynsworth v. Lloyd's of London, 121 F.3d 956 (5th Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 140 L.Ed. 2d 666 (1998).
100. See Riley v. Kingsley Underwriting Agencies, Ltd., 969 F.2d 953 (10th Cir.
1992) (the 10th Circuit's Lloyd's decision).
101. See Allen v. Lloyd's of London, 94 F.3d 923 (4th Cir. 1996). Although most
of the various Lloyd's cases are basically similar, the Allen case was unique in
that it involved the American Names attempting to sue to receive more informa-
tion from Lloyd's about their attempt to implement a reinsurance scheme ("Plan
for Reconstruction and Renewal"). See Allen, 94 F.3d at 927. Lloyd's successfully
argued that the reinsurance scheme was not a "security," and therefore not subject
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the anti-waiver provisions as highly relevant. In Roby,"°2 the
Second Circuit came closer to Richards I when it considered
the anti-waiver provisions significant as a showing that the
Congress had weighed in on the idea that the American securi-
ties laws are important public policy and found that in deter-
mining to enforce the Lloyd's Agreement it had to first conduct
an analysis based on a The Bremen reasonableness test. Put
another way, the Roby court used the anti-waiver provisions as
a factor in measuring how significant to public policy are the
American securities laws and then balanced them against the
Supreme Court deference to private choice-of-law or forum
selection agreements. The Roby court did not consider the anti-
waiver provisions a complete prohibition to parties choosing to
have their potential conflicts adjudicated under other laws
than American. It is not clear why the Roby court would look
to a clear, unambiguous anti-waiver statute as an element in a
balancing test.
The Fifth Circuit did, however, face the issue of the anti-
waiver provisions squarely in Haynsworth, (a decision rendered
shortly after Richards 1) and arrived at a conclusion that the
provisions do not prohibit parties from contracting out of
American securities laws.' °3 The Haynsworth court relied pri-
marily on Scherk for this position, and argued that the fact the
parties in that case had their claims adjudicated under Ameri-
can law was not relevant: " ... for Scherk involved a foreign
forum selection clause accompanied by a choice-of-law clause
selecting the law of Illinois. Presumably, this meant that the
parties could rely on the protections of the federal securities
laws as well, but the decision did not rest on this assump-
tion." ' 4 Instead the Court roundly rejected the notion that a
forum selection clause can be circumvented by a party's as-
serting the unavailability of American remedies. The Fifth Cir-
cuit interpretation of Scherk, means that the anti-waiver provi-
sions of the Acts do not apply to international transactions
despite no direct language by the court directly on that partic-
to the Acts. Id. The other circuits, as well as the SEC, have not made a determi-
nation if the actual investment itself constitutes a security under the Acts. Rich-
ards I, ruling on an appeal from a dismissal of the Names' complaint, assumed
that the Lloyd's investment was a security. See Richards I, 107 F.3d at 1425.
102. Roby v. Corporation of Lloyd's, 996 F.2d 1353 (2d Cir. 1993).
103. See Haynsworth v. Lloyd's of London, 121 F.3d 956 (5th Cir. 1970).
104. Id. at 967. (emphasis added).
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ular point.
The interpretation of the anti-waiver provisions by the
various circuits in the Lloyd's cases reveals that only three cir-
cuits have addressed the issue in any significance.0 5 Of the
three, the Roby court used the anti-waiver provisions only as a
factor in discussing the policy considerations under The Bre-
men. The Roby court did 'not determine whether or not the
provisions directly bear on the Lloyd's Agreement itself. The
Roby decision, by using the anti-waiver provisions as a factor
in measuring the weight of public policy, did not adequately
address the issue of the statute directly. Therefore only two
circuits, the Fifth and the Ninth, have looked at the choice
clauses turning principally on the interpretation of the anti-
waiver provisions, and have come to different results. When
looked at in this light, in regard to the anti-waiver provisions,
the Richards I decision is not as isolated as it might otherwise
appear. In addition, Richards I was also correct in its analysis
that in determining whether to enforce the Lloyd's Agreement,
the courts should first deal with the anti-waiver statutes 6
before moving on to a balancing of public policy interests.0 7
As discussed above, Richards II immediately went into a The
Bremen test of public interest.
C. The "Substance-Procedure" Theory
Some of the circuit courts in the Lloyd's matter have con-
strued the line of cases following The Bremen as differentiating
between upholding enforcement of choice and forum selection
clauses when the clauses merely imposed a "procedural" basis
105. See Roby, 996 F.3d at 1353; Richards I, 107 F.3d at 1422; Haynsworth,
121 F.3d at 956.
106. See Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a).
107. See Richards I, 107 F.3d at 1428-29. In addition, Roby is distinguishable
from Richards I and Haynsworth because Roby actually concedes that "[fin a
sense, the securities laws somewhat resemble the antitrust laws at issue in
Mitsubishi." See Roby, 996 F.2d at 1634. If that were true, the Mitsubishi decision
advises that it would strike the choice clause if it prevented a party from pursu-
ing statutory remedies (it does not mention weighing public policy when faced
with a claim based on a statute). Id. The Mitsubishi decision reads closer to the
proposition that when Congress has enacted a provision to void non-compliance
with the statute, congressional intent will trump The Bremen prodigy. The Roby
decision recognizes this distinction, but fails to analyze it. Haynsworth, however,
reads Scherk as holding the anti-waiver provisions do not reach international
transactions.
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for adjudication, but considered the loss of "substantive" rights
as a result of choice-of-law clauses more troublesome.108 An-
other way of looking at this substance-procedure theory is that
the Supreme Court has in reality only upheld forum selection
clauses, but has not upheld choice-of-law cases. In Richards I,
the court argued that the relevant Supreme Courts prece-
dents," 9 especially McMahon, establish that "substantive
rights" can not be waived, even in the face of the Arbitration
Act, and "[bly this test, [since] the Choice Clauses require the
waiver of substantive provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts
[they] are consequently void.""0
This substantive-procedural theory, however, potentially
can lead to confusion regarding the arguments of the American
Names. If applied, the substance-procedure argument dis-
cussed in Richards I would be at direct odds with the purposes
of The Bremen and subsequent Supreme Court cases that advo-
cate the expanding freedom to choose forums to foster interna-
tional business transactions. The Haynsworth"' decision cor-
108. See Roby, 996 F.2d at 1362 (distinguishes the situation in the Lloyd's
cases based upon the substance-procedure concept from the seminal securities
arbitration cases of Rodriguez and McMahon). See id. See also No Way Out, supra
note 70, at 74-76 (criticizing the Bonny, Riley and Roby courts for enforcing the
choice clauses despite the resulting loss to the American Names of the substantive
protections of the Acts). The author also argues that the Supreme Court has in
fact only ruled on forum selection clauses, not choice of law clauses, which pertain
to "substantive" rights.
109. See infra, part II.
110. Richards I, 107 F.3d at 1428. The court went on to state: "The Bremen
did not apply the reasonableness test in the face of a statute purporting to decide
the question of the choice-of-forum's enforceability." Id. But see Allen, 923 F.3d at
929 (argument of the court that "[W]e do not believe that Congress intended that
the disclosure requirements of the United States securities law be exported and
imposed as governing principles on markets conducted entirely in other countries
simply because membership in such markets is solicited in the United States."
Allen, 923 F.3d at 929, (citing Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell,
468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d. Cir 1992)) (emphasis added). The Leasco case, however,
concerned an American company, not individual investors. Moreover, the Allen
court downplays the extent of the contacts with the United States in the Lloyd's
matter by alluding that the Names were participating in a predominantly foreign
market because they travelled to London to have a personal interview and sign
their agreement. See Allen, 94 F.3d at 929. Not only were the Names solicited in
the United States, many of the syndicates they belonged to were destroyed by
huge financial losses because of "long-tail" risks from asbestos and toxic waste in
the United States.
111. See Haynsworth v. Lloyd's of London, 121 F.3d 956 (5th Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, 140 L. Ed. 2d 666 (1998).
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rectly deals with the substance-procedure, (or "waiver of sub-
stantive rights" theory) by arguing that when parties agree to
a forum selection clause, the assumption is that the substan-
tive law used to resolve the disputes will be the law of the
forum selected."' Furthermore, the substantive-procedural
theory is analytically flawed because the distinction could
potentially render all choice-of-law clauses void unless the
forum state contained an exact substitute substantive law that
would be enjoyed if the parties were in American courts. That
result, absent a clear congressional showing as discussed
above, certainly defeats the spirit of The Bremen and subse-
quent decisions. In the words of the Fifth Circuit "[tihe view
that every foreign forum's remedies must duplicate those avail-
able under American law would render all forum selection
clauses worthless and severely hinder Americans' ability to
participate in international commerce.""' The Roby court, in
raising the substance-procedure distinction, concluded that the
Shearson/American Express v. McMahon case" was not ap-
plicable to the Lloyd's cases because it only stood for granting
arbitration in cases involving the securities laws when the
substantive protections of the securities laws will be used as
the basis for resolving the dispute."5 The court correctly
pointed out that if the American Names had argued "merely to
the judicial choice of an arbitral forum, we would reject their
claim immediately.... ,6 Since, however, the Names had
argued that the enforcement of the Lloyd's Agreement" 7
would deprive them of the substantive rights of the securities
112. "The sophisticated individuals entering into these agreements are hardly
so naive as to believe that by choosing only a foreign forum and not the law to be
applied therein, they thereby retain some inalienable privilege of litigating their
disputes under American law." Id. at 967-968.
113. Id. The court goes on to say it accepts the Second Circuit's position on
the substance-procedure theory. It is referring to the Roby court's statement that
"[it defies reason to suggest that a plaintiff may circumvent forum selection and
arbitration clauses merely by stating claims under laws not recognized by the
forum selected in the agreement. A plaintiff simply would have to allege violations
of his country's tort law or his country's statutory law or his country's property
law in order to render nugatory any forum selection clause ... " See Roby, 996
F.2d at 1360.
114. See McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1986).
115. See Roby, 996 F.2d at 1362.
116. Id.
117. See Lloyd's Agreement, supra note 3.
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laws, the Roby court concluded that both Rodriguez and
McMahon did not apply because this was an international
agreement.' The court instead conducted the following anal-
ysis if a) whether there is a Supreme Court precedent that
stands for when parties can waive their substantive rights in
international agreements and b) whether British laws would
adequately reflect the substantive provisions of American secu-
rities laws if the American litigants have to sue in Britain."'
The court concluded that The Bremen did allow for the waiver
of substantive laws, and that British law does provide ade-
quate remedies for the Americans. This holding shows the
problems for the American Names in relying on the substance-
procedure theory because the courts can find precedent for
waiving substantive rights from The Bremen line of cases easi-
ly. As discussed earlier, the Court has endorsed choice-of-law
and forum selection clauses in international agreements in the
interests of promoting commerce. The ability of private parties
in international business transactions to pre-determine which
substantive law will be used to resolve disputes is the core of
the Supreme Court's rulings. Therefore, the substance-proce-
dure argument can lead a court, like in the Roby decision, to
conclude that the Lloyd's Agreement should be enforced since
choice-of-law determinations in international agreements are
presumed valid. In other words, the substantive law pre-deter-
mined in the choice-of-law clause would have to contravene
public policy to rise to the level where the court would not
enforce it. 20 In addition, by framing the argument in terms
of substance-procedure (or sometimes substance v. procedure),
the courts may look to the substantive law of the foreign coun-
try to ascertain if the foreign forum will adequately protect the
American citizen. Again, if the court is conducting this type of
analysis, the precedents all point to allowing the choice clause
to stand because the courts realize that it cannot be expected
that foreign courts will reflect precisely American substantive
law. Moreover, it is evident that the theory is susceptible to
the allegations made against it by the Haynsworth court that
all a party need to do to get out of their commitment is to
claim the foreign forum does not replicate American substan-
118. See Roby, 996 F.2d at 1362.
119. See id., at 1362 (Part II, A and B).
120. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 15 (1972).
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tive law. To illustrate the point, the Haynsworth court said:
"We refuse to accept the notion... that the sheer scope of the
U.S. securities law automatically renders [the securities laws]
of other countries inferior or should provide American inves-
tors a means to escape their contractual obligations when they
begin to prove too costly." 2'
The American Name's position that only Congress can
determine whether the securities laws can be waived by Amer-
ican citizens is clouded by the substance-procedure argument.
It is not compelling enough to overcome the Supreme Court's
clear preference in favor of a party's right in contracting a pre-
determined specific forum, including a pre-determined substan-
tive law. In order to correctly state the issue, it should be
pointed out that the Supreme Court has not recognized choice-
of-law clauses when they would deprive a party a "substantive"
right conferred by a statute. In other words, "substantive" law
can, of course, be pre-determined by private parties by a
choice-of-law clause, but substantive rights conferred by stat-
ute explicitly denying waiver of those rights can not be waived
through the mechanism of a choice clause. In this regard the
McMahon'22 holding that the means of adjudicating a securi-
ties claim can be arbitrated, as long as the securities laws
themselves will be used in the arbitration, is a substantial
factor in the Lloyd's litigation. If the transaction between
Lloyd's and the Names is determined to be covered by the Acts,
then as Justice O'Connor wrote in McMahon: "What the anti-
waiver provision of section 29(a) forbids is enforcement of
agreements to waive 'compliance' with the provisions of the
statute.. . By its terms section 29(a) only prohibits waiver of
the substantive obligations imposed by the Exchange Act""
(Another way of looking at this is substantive law derived from
a statute). Although McMahon was decided in the domestic
context, the Court was clear in its determination that
Congress' intentions in protecting American investors would be
121. Haynsworth, 121 F.3d at 969.
122. McMahon overturned, in part, Wilco v. Swan, 316 U.S. 427 (1953), by al-
lowing arbitration in 10b-5 claims. Wilco previously held, inter alia, that the anti-
waiver provisions of the Acts barred arbitration. In Rodriguez de Qujas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989), the Court followed the lead
of McMahon and allowed arbitration in all securities claims.
123. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 229.
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consistent with allowing alternative dispute resolutions as long
as the dispute was governed by the statute itself. The caution
displayed by the majority in McMahon in assuring that its
holding did not threaten waiver of the substantive statutory
provisions of the Acts clearly illustrates that the Court's views
those protections as unwaivable. Therefore, under this reading
the Lloyd's Agreement is illegal.
D. CONCLUSION
There are two reasons why the Richards I decision should
not have been withdrawn in its holding that the anti-waiver
provisions of the Acts preclude enforcement of the Lloyd's
Agreement. The first is that it recognized that Scherk never
held outright that the securities laws could be waived. Rich-
ards I correctly pointed out that the international nature of
Scherk did not raise the same issues as the Lloyd's situation
where Lloyd's solicited membership from United States citizens
in the United States. Moreover, the court recognized that sim-
ply because the Court speaks of enhancing international com-
merce by allowing parties to contract pre-determined forums
etc., that does not mean that the circuit courts can go further
than the Supreme Court has ever gone and allow an American
party to waive out of what Congress has declared unwaivable.
There is simply no precedent to waive out of the Acts. Richards
II went down the wrong path of surrendering national sover-
eignty because of a misperceived fear of the courts hindering
international commerce. This is not a rationale that should
deprive the Names of their day in an American court. As stat-
ed earlier, the amount of contact Lloyd's has in the United
States does not make applying the securities laws an act of
"overreaching."
The second reason that Richards I should not have been
withdrawn was that it reserved for Congress the policy of de-
termining whether American investors can waive their rights
under the Acts. By emphasizing the advantages to internation-
al commerce, Richards II overlooked that they may have
opened the door for foreign entities to sell securities in the
United States to small investors who do not posses the finan-
cial sophistication and background of the Names. The dissent-
ing judges in the 5-4 Scherk decision voiced similar concerns.
Justice Douglas' dissent contained this warning:
656 [Vol. XXIV:2
LLOYD'S OF LONDON
This invocation of the 'international contract' talisman might
be applied to a situation where... an interest in a foreign
company or mutual fund was sold to an utterly unsophisticat-
ed American citizen, with material fraudulent misrepresenta-
tions made in this country. The arbitration clause could ap-
pear in fine print of a form contract, and still be sufficient to
preclude recourse to our courts ....
One of the primary purposes of the American securities
laws is to give the defrauded investor strong protections.'m In
this important policy decision "[iut is important that American
standards of fairness in security dealings govern the destinies
of investors until Congress changes these standards."'26 Im-
plicit in this statement is a prudent deferral to the legislature.
The Richards I court refused to enter into a policy making role
where it would be overstepping its bounds.
V. THE RICHARDS I ASSERTION THAT ENGLAND DOES NOT
PROVIDE A PROPER FORUM FOR THE AMERICAN NAMES
The Richards I decision held that the Lloyd's Agreement
was unenforceable due to the anti-waiver provisions of the
Acts. Therefore, the court did not have to reach the question of
whether the application of English law would violate a strong
public policy of the United States. 7 The court did argue,
however, in response to the decisions of the other circuits that
the remedies available in England "are not adequate substi-
tutes for the firm shields and the finely honed swords provided
by the American securities laws.""2 The discussion of wheth-
er the remedies in England would contravene public policy of
the United States requires, at least, two inquiries: 1) what are
the remedies provided for the Names in England, and 2) what
124. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 528 (1974) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting).
125. See Herman & MacClain v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 390 (1983).
126. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 528 (Douglas, J. dissenting). It is important to remem-
ber that the dissent in Scherk was responding only to the possibility that future
cases may deprive Americans from the protections of the Acts. Id. As pointed out
in the discussion of Scherk, infra, the majority argues the contacts in Scherk are
largely foreign, and leaves to another day a ruling when the factual situation is
different. See Scherk, 417 U.S. at 517 n.11.
127. Richards I, 107 F.3d at 1428-29.
128. Id. at 1430.
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is the legal standard to determine if the remedies are insuffi-
cient.
In the Richards I decision, the court relied on the SEC's
analysis of the deficiencies of the English remedies.129 Accord-
ing to the SEC, English remedies provide no cause of action for
failing to register as a security.3 ' The English remedies for
misrepresentation fall short of the American securities laws
standards. 3' In addition, the 1982 Lloyd's Acts specifically
insulate Lloyd's itself for any damages resulting from their
negligence or breach of fiduciary duty unless the actions caus-
ing the damage were done "in bad faith." 2 That provision re-
sulted in lawsuits being directed at the Managing Agents, who
did not have the "deep pockets" of Lloyd's itself. Moreover, the
American securities law's general policy of full and complete
disclosure is not adequately reflected in English law."' For
all of those reasons the Richards I court determined that the
English remedies do not adequately support the Names, and
therefore, to enforcement of the Lloyd's Agreement would vio-
late a public policy of the United States.
In England, the American Names would not be protected
by the English securities laws. Lloyd's is specifically exempted
from the Financial Services Act (FSA)."' The comparisons
between American and English securities laws are, however,
not irrelevant."' In regard to misrepresentation, the dissent
in Richards I argues that section 47 of the FSA provides for
penalties for "misleading statements or omissions made know-
129. Id. at 1429.
130. See SEC Brief, supra note 70, at 20. Registration requirements are found
under § 12(1) of the 1933 Securities Act.
131. Id.
132. Richards I, 107 F.3d at 1429.
133. See Allen v. Lloyd's of London, No. 3:96cv522, slip op. at 49-52 (E.D. Va.
Aug. 23, 1995).
134. See Financial Services Act of 1986, ch. IV, § 42 (stating "[tihe Society of
Lloyd's and persons permitted by the Council of Lloyd's Act to act as underwriting
agents at Lloyd's are exempted persons as respects investment business carried on
in connection with the purpose of insurance business at Lloyd's.").
135. The District Court in the Allen case, after holding that the common law
remedies available to the American Names do not adequately reflect American
securities laws, argues that the English disclosure requirements of the FSA § 61
do not adequately reflect American public policy because it provides for no private
right of action. Parties must sue to obtain injunctive relief. Allen v. Lloyd's of
London, No. 3:96cv522, slip op. at 53-54 (E.D. Va. Aug. 23, 1995).
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ingly or recklessly.""'3 Since Lloyd's itself is not exempt for
acts done in "bad faith" it could be liable under this section.
This analysis, however, turns on the question of whether reck-
less conduct reaches the level of bad faith. Moreover, even if
section 47 was available to the Names, it would only be a
small segment of the FSA. The dissent argues further that the
Names have adequate protections available to them because
English law provides compensation for "fraudulent, negligent,
and even innocent misrepresentation."3 ' The Roby and Allen
courts are in agreement that English common law provides
perhaps even a greater forum for the Names because their
misrepresentation law has a low scienter requirement.' 8
Richards II, and the other circuits which are at odds with
the Richards I opinion also argue that the disclosure require-
ments in England, although not up to American standards, are
sufficient enough to protect the American Names. In Roby, for
example, the court pointed out that the Member's Agent Agree-
ment requires timely notice of relevant information to each
Name.'39 This disclosure provides for information to the
Name "which could reasonably be expected to influence the
Name in deciding to become or remain a member ... ."
Therefore, although the Names are not protected by substan-
tive English disclosure laws, they have a contract claim to sue
under.
There are strong arguments supporting both sides of the
issue of whether the English laws provide an adequate forum
for the Names. The decision rests on what legal standard
should be applied by a court when making this determination.
The dissent in Richards I argues that the criteria for a forum
non conveniens case should apply when determining if a for-
eign forum contravenes a strong American public policy:
"While English and American remedies are not identical, 'the
possibility of an unfavorable change in law' should not be dis-
positive unless the 'remedy provided by the alternate forum is
so clearly inadequate or unsatisfactory that it is no remedy at
all."' In applying the forum non conveniens standard, the
136. Richards I, 107 F.3d at 1435.
137. See Id.
138. See Roby, 996 F.3d at 1353.
139. Id. at 1366.
140. Id.
141. Richards I, 107 F.3d at 1434, (quoting Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454
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dissent seems to echo the Roby and Allen courts who thought
English law is adequate, although it does not provide as great
a remedy as the American courts.
The majority opinion in Richards I looks at particulars of
the public policy, in this case the policy of the securities laws,
and evaluates how these policies are carried out in the foreign
forum. As discussed, the court looked at the overall policy in
regard to disclosure, misrepresentation, and private right of
action. The court gave more weight to public policy than did
the dissent's forum non conveniens analysis. The dissent would
have erroneously held that American public policy would be
violated only if there is absolutely no credible remedy. This
analysis does not comport with the concern the Supreme Court
has shown in protecting such interests, and is certainly not
consistent with United States securities laws. The dissent's
analysis is even more troubling in that it would allow private
parties to contract out of the securities laws despite the anti-
waiver provisions provided only that the substitute forum
provided practically any remedy. Therefore, the forum non
conveniens approach does not provide a decent legal standard
to determine whether a substitute forum violates the public
policies embodied in the securities laws. Instead, a court
should conduct a fact-based analysis similar to the approach in
Richards L
In conclusion, the position of the Richards II decision is
that even though the Names, or any future investor who enters
into a choice-of-law agreement, do not have recourse to any
securities laws, either in America or in the chosen forum, ac-
cess to American courts will be denied as long as there is some
remedy available to them. Assuming that even if the Names
can prove that participation in Lloyd's involves securities, they
in essence have waived their rights to sue under the securities
laws. In short, the congressional policy of providing heightened
protection for investors is vitiated by the fact that the choice-
of-law clause was entered into with a foreign company. As
pointed out by the dissent in Richards II, "[t]he majority es-
pouses a reasonable foreign policy, but one which emanates
from the wrong branch of government."' Allowing Ameri-
U.S. 235, 254-55 (1981)).
142. Richards II, 135 F.3d at 1297.
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cans investors to re-enter the world of caveat emptor when
dealing with securities is certainly a debatable issue; in light of
the growing dominance of global markets, that road may be
the correct one taken. The decision to proceed down that road
can not be made, however, by the judicial branch of govern-
ment, but only by the Congress.
VI. CONCLUSION
Faced with a difficult issue, the Richards I court choose
the more difficult path in nullifying the Lloyd's Agreement. In
doing so they struck down a freely contracted provision that
has been used by Lloyd's for years. The case seems easy when
one looks at the fact the Names flew to London to sign the
agreement, and as wealthy individuals they had every opportu-
nity to examine the situation in detail before signing. The
Lloyd's Agreement helped give certainty to the Society of
Lloyd's, an operation with members in over eighty coun-
tries.' In addition, the weight of case law favored Lloyd's.
The other circuits saw the Names anti-waiver argument as a
desperate attempt to back out of a bad deal.' Despite all of
these compelling reasons given by the other circuits ruling in
the Lloyd's matter, the Richards I opinion kept its head and
correctly diagnosed the real issue: Congress has not allowed for
American citizens to lose the projections of the most efficient
and trustworthy securities laws in the world simply because of
a choice-of-law clause. Richards I was not over-reaching in
coming to this conclusion; the decision was endorsed by the
Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, Henry Hyde:
I am heartened... by the recent appeals court ruling in
Richards v. Lloyds of London (Richards 1) and strong pro-
143. See Roby, 996 F.2d at 1364. See also Allen v. Lloyd's of London, 94 F.3d
923, 930 (4th Cir. 1996) (stating that "[ilmposing United States securities laws on
this foreign market would directly contravene the very rules and regulations
adopted by Britain for the creation and operation of the Lloyd's market to which
the Names subscribed").
144. Id. at 1360. "We refuse to allow a party's solemn promise to be defeated
by artful pleading." Id. But see Roberta S. Karmel, Sex, Lloyd's and Pre-Dispute
Waivers, N.Y.L.J., June 18, 1998, at 3. (stating that "unarticulated financial exi-
gencies are not a good basis for judicial decision making that subjects the plain-
tiffs in these cases to enormous personal financial losses. Whether the plaintiffs
were free to waive their procedural and substantive rights under the federal secu-
rities laws is a question of statutory interpretation and public policy.").
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nouncements by the SEC in that appeal, which recognize the
statutory bar against agreements which waive compliance
with the Federal Securities laws... When foreign promoters
come into [the] states to raise capital, they cannot effectuate
waivers of substantive rights under the securities laws that
belong to those from whom they solicit capital.145
In addition, the reasons for enforcing the Lloyd's Agree-
ment do not sound as compelling when looked at in a different
light. For example, Lloyd's broke with long tradition to allow
American Names only when it was faced with financial difficul-
ty. Although Richards /1 and the other circuits looking at this
issue have pointed out how the American Names knew full
well what they were doing when they signed the Lloyd's Agree-
ment, they do not point out that Lloyd's was well represented
when it solicited members in the United States, and presum-
ably they knew the purpose of the American securities laws.
The fact that the Names knew the consequences of their ac-
tions does not seem to be as significant as Lloyd's knowledge of
the securities laws. Lloyd's was in a better position to know
the law than the individual Names. Regarding the argument
that Lloyd's desired predictability and certainty in being cer-
tain about which forum to bring litigation, Lloyd's could be
satisfied by knowing that when they solicit American citizens
in the United States, they will abide by the American securi-
ties laws. The amount of contact the Lloyd's transaction had
with the United States belies the argument that applying the
American securities laws to this agreement is somehow an
artificial "overreaching or overextension." The Names were
solicited in America, there is a Lloyd's Trust Fund in America,
and many of the risks insured by Lloyd's were in America. The
idea that the American securities laws should not apply to
such a situation because international comity fails when look-
ing at the weight of the contacts in the United States. Finally,
the Richards H Circuit decision reopens the prospect of poten-
tial mischief coming from foreign companies emboldened by the
courts refusal to enforce the securities laws. Without those
protections, off-shore companies are free to solicit American
145. United States Investors in Lloyd's of London Deserve Their Day in United
States Court, 143 CONG. REC. E1608 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1997) (statement of Rep.
Hyde).
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investors and could enforce a choice-of-law clause resulting in
minimal protection to the investors. This is an admittedly
parental outlook on the capabilities of investors. This outlook,
however, is our financial policy, has served investors well since
1933, and should not be changed until debated in the legisla-
ture.
James Gange

